

# Implementing Security into Agile SDLC

Anderson Dadario, CISSP, CSSLP Flare Security







- Anderson Dadario
- Consultant at Flare Security
- 5+ years working with development & infosec





#### What you will learn



- Motivations for Secure SDLC
- A little about Waterfall SDLC Security
- Agile SDLC Security
  - Security Resources Allocation
  - Risk Management
  - How to scale security resources
- Software Assurance Maturity Model





#### What's your security program?




- Nothing but a scan after release?
  - Automated?
    - Looking for a badge or seal?
  - Manual?
    - Ad hoc?






#### Motivations for Secure SDLC (1-2)








http://www.microsoft.com/security/sdl/about/benefits.aspx






#### Motivations for Secure SDLC (2-2)








https://www.owasp.org/images/5/56/OWASP\_Testing\_Guide\_v3.pdf





#### Waterfall Methodology






#### Waterfall Characteristics



- Well-defined sequential phases;
- Significant part of the project must be planned upfront;
- Stresses the importance of requirements;
- Changes are controlled. Major changes are only allowed if the CCB (Change Control Board) approves them.







It's time to ...




# INJECT SECURITY






#### Waterfall Security







#### Waterfall Security Characteristics



- Bundled within each phase;
- Few or no meetings at all with the Security team;
- Bureaucratic as Waterfall demands to be.








#### Scrum Roles










#### Scrum Artifacts












#### Scrum Ceremonies









It's time to ....



# INJECT SECURITY





#### But first keep these points in mind



- Understand the methodologies currently in use at your company;
- Maximize the efficiency of security injection;
- Avoid Single Point of Failure (absence of a security expert);
- There will be multiple products for limited security experts;
- · Your company may hire more developers than security experts;
- The software must be rugged (Rugged Software Manifesto).





#### The Rugged Manifesto


#### The Rugged Manifesto

I am rugged and, more importantly, my code is rugged. I recognize that software has become a foundation of our modern world. I recognize the awesome responsibility that comes with this foundational role. I recognize that my code will be used in ways I cannot anticipate, in ways it was not designed, and for longer than it was ever intended.

I recognize that my code will be attacked by talented and persistent adversaries who threaten our physical, economic and national security.

I recognize these things - and I choose to be rugged.

I am rugged because I refuse to be a source of vulnerability or weakness. I am rugged because I assure my code will support its mission. I am rugged because my code can face these challenges and persist in spite of them. I am rugged, not because it is easy, but because it is necessary and I am up for the challenge.








#### Strategy #1 Participate in everything









#### Strategy #1 Analysis



## Pros:

- Security Expert is complete aware of the project and can rapidly inject security:
  - in the sprint backlog stories;
  - doing security awareness during the ceremonies.


# Cons:

- Security Expert's time got too much consumed;
- · Single Point of Failure;
- Planning participation is most of the part a waste of time;
- Too much daily become troublesome.



#### Strategy #2 Post-Planning, 'Dailyless'







#### Strategy #2 Analysis



## Pros:

Security Expert's time is used wisely.

# Cons:

- You are messing up with Scrum methodology because stories cannot change after planning;
- Single Point of Failure persists;
- Less security awareness.






#### Strategy #3 Grooming, Security Roles











#### Strategy #3 Analysis



## Pros:

- Security Expert's time is used wisely;
- No Single Point of Failure;
- Security injection that respects the development process.

# Cons:

 More people are involved, then the security injection become more complex.





#### This ain't over. What about ...



- Stories that are created after the planning?
- Security stories negotiation?
- Risk Management?
- Maximize even more the security injection?





#### Stories that are created after the planning



- It should not be common, but it can happen;
- Define a process to handle it;
- The Information Security team must be aware and perform its assessment.





#### Security stories negotiation



- It will always be a challenge, no matter what;
- Focus on the risk;
- Define the Quality Gates before publish and agree these gates with the Product Owner.





#### Risk Management (1-3)



- Perform Threat Modeling on Grooming;
- Inject Security on:
  - Acceptance Criteria for specific requirements;
  - Definition of Done for generic requirements.
- Automate Security Acceptance Criteria tests;





#### Risk Management (2-3)



- Take advantage of the agile tools:
  - Put labels on Jira stories;
- Extract the labeled stories using JQL (Jira Query Language) API;
- Integrate the extracted risks to your company risks platform / dashboard;





#### Risk Management (3-3)



	CONTENE			
Threat Model Case #ID	05			
Asset	User Credentials			
Threat	Threat action aimed to illegally access and use another user's credentials, such as username and password.			
Risk	High			
Threat Agent	External Attacker			
Threat Type (STRIDE)	Spoofing			
Security Control	Authentication			
Mitigation Controls	<ul> <li>Appropriate authentication</li> <li>Protect secret data</li> <li>Don't store secrets</li> </ul>			
Incident Response Procedures	Block user account, revoke password, etc			





#### Maximize even more the Security Injection




- Extreme Programming (XP) practices
  - Continuous Processes
    - Continuous Integration
    - Design Improvement
  - Shared Understanding
    - Coding Standard
    - Collective Code Ownership
    - Simple Design
- DevOps Security, Security Champions
- Mailing Lists, Tech Talks, Software Assurance Maturity Model





#### OpenSAMM (1-2)









#### OpenSAMM (2-2)



OPENSAMM Assessment Worksheet					
Business Functions	Security Practices	Activities	Answei	Ratings	
Stra		ls there a software security assurance program already in place?	Yes 🔻	1+	
		Do most of the business stakeholders understand your organization's risk profile?	Yes		
		is most of your development staff aware of future plans for the assurance program?	Yes 🔻		
	Strategy &	Are most of your applications and resources categorized by risk?	No 🔻		
	Metrics	Are risk ratings used to tailor the required assurance activities?	No 🔻		
		Does most of the organization know about what's required based on risk ratings?	No 🔻		
		Is per-project data for cost of assurance activities collected?	Yes 🔻		
		Does your organization regularly compare your security spend with other organizations?	Yes ▽	,	
Governance	Policy & Does Compliance Are pr	Do most project stakeholders know their project's compliance status?	7		
		Are compliance requirements specifically considered by project teams?	-	0	
		Does the organization utilize a set of policies and standards to control software development?			
		Are project teams able to request an audit for compliance with policies and standards?	-		
		Are projects periodically audited to ensure a baseline of compliance with policies and standards?		7	
		Does the organization systematically use audits to collect and control compliance evidence?	7	,	





### **Final Thoughts**



- The more you respect the developers process, the more they will respect yours;
- Scrum is about constant learning so always be thinking how you can tweak your process to make it better;
- Apply the concepts to the way of your company builds software since there is no silver bullet.





#### References & Resources



- Scrum.org: <a href="https://www.scrum.org/">https://www.scrum.org/</a>
- Extreme Programming: <a href="http://www.extremeprogramming.org/">http://www.extremeprogramming.org/</a>
- Veracode Webinars:
  - https://info.veracode.com/webinar-secure-agile-through-an-automated-toolchain-how-veracode-rd-does-it.html
  - https://info.veracode.com/webinar-building-security-into-the-agile-sdlc.html
- RSA Conference Europe: <a href="http://www.rsaconference.com/writable/presentations/file\_upload/asec-107.pdf">http://www.rsaconference.com/writable/presentations/file\_upload/asec-107.pdf</a>
- Gotham: http://pt.slideshare.net/SOURCEConference/are-agile-and-secure-development-mutually-exclusive-source-2011
- Microsoft SDL: <a href="http://microsoft.com/sdl">http://microsoft.com/sdl</a>
- OWASP: <a href="https://www.owasp.org">https://www.owasp.org</a>
- OpenSAMM: <a href="http://www.opensamm.org/">http://www.opensamm.org/</a>
- Flare Security: <a href="http://flaresecurity.com">http://flaresecurity.com</a>
- Anderson Dadario's blog: <a href="http://dadario.com.br">http://dadario.com.br</a>
- Rugged Software: <a href="https://www.ruggedsoftware.org/">https://www.ruggedsoftware.org/</a>







# Thank You

Anderson Dadario, CISSP, CSSLP

http://dadario.com.br

http://flaresecurity.com



